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ABSTRACT

In this comparison of the political "images" of Richard Nixon and George McGovern, public opinion data were collected on President Nixon in 1968 and 1972 and on Senator McGovern in 1972 just before and just after the television broadcast of the biography of McGovern. Changes in political attitudes toward Nixon and McGovern as a result of the television broadcast were sought in an effort to measure its effect on public political opinions. Bi-polar attitude testing (bold/timid, fair/unfair, expert/ignorant, for example) was used. Results show that the broadcast tended to confirm the opinion of those who favored McGovern before the broadcast, but it did not materially affect the image of President Nixon. (CH)

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MULTIPLE FACETS OF CANDIDATE IMAGE STRUCTURE: EFFECTS OF THE McGOVERN TELEVISION BIOGRAPHY

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> "The American voter, insisting upon his belief in a higher order, clings to his religion, which promises another, better life; and defends, passionately the illusion that the men he chooses to lead him are of finer nature than he. It has been traditional that the successful politician honor this illusion. To succeed today, however, he must embellish it." (14)

McGinniss' statement represents one currently popular reason for the importance given to candidate image by the politicians within the last 30 years. These candidates, especially potential presidents, are presumably measured by the American voter, against an ideal that's a combination of leading men: God, father, hero, pope, king. "They want him to be larger than life, a living legend, and yet quintessentially human; someone to be held up to their children as a model; and someone to be cherished by themselves as a revered member of the family." (14)

In order to measure up to this ideal, the candidate must convey the illusion of positive characteristics even in the face of less glamourous realities. He must select and emphasize the most appealing of his qualities, publicize them widely and repetitiously, and at the same time play down any limitations. This process of selectively publicizing desirable attributes is what Nimmo, along with professional campaigners term "image projection". (15)

Candidates and their professional campaigners have found in the past that the mass media offer the best means for projecting an appealing image. They have come to depend primarily on television for this function since television is

the medium most adept at transmitting the personality of the candidate to the public. "TV brings the action directly to the viewer. It is personal, it is completely realistic. It is direct communication often staged and embellished for a desired effect, but pure and basic, virtually person to person." (3)

Taking these characteristics of television into account, the professional campaigner endeavors to exploit the best features of his candidate's personality to form the "television personality" or "image candidate". Through research, rehearsal, and controlling and staging events the candidate is never allowed to expose his naked personality. (15)

Numerous techniques are employed by politicians to achieve television personality status. These techniques are usually based on an appeal to the tastes, rather than to the convictions of Americans, since professional campaigners seem convinced that personalities and not issues or political parties win votes. "The overall ploy is contrived spontaneity, the effort to appear uninhibited, candid, open, and credible without running the risk of an unrehearsed performance." (15)

Another reason why politicians are relying more on television is that for the last decade, television has become the major source of campaign information for the public. Surveys dating back to 1959 indicate that increasing proportions of Americans get most of their news from television rather than from radio, newspapers, or magazines. In 1959, for example,

51 percent named television as their principal news source; the proportion rose steadily in each study with 62 percent citing TV as the principal source in 1971. (16)

Corresponding with the candidates' increased emphasis on their projected image over the last three decades has been the influx of research studies concerning candidate image. For the most part, these studies have attempted to not only explicate the concept of candidate image but also analyze the effect of various stimuli, i.e., candidates' appearance, speeches, etc., upon the image of the candidate held by the voter. But what is "image"? Many different images can be operationally defined, and it is likely that the same communication will have different affects, or no affect, depending upon how the image is defined.

Although the majority of researchers implicitly conceptualize candidate image through personal attributes, the operationalism of the concept is as varied as the research performed.

Auer (2), Lubel (13), and Katz and Feldman (9) defined candidate image as the personality or perceived attributes of the candidates. Carter (4), in his analysis of the 1960 debates, used an adjective check list to define candidate image; the adjectives related primarily to the candidates' personal attributes. Graber (7) defined image as the sum of qualities, personal and political, by which a candidate is characterized by the press or by an observer. Sears (17) referred to candidate image as merely personal character references.

Tannenbaum, Greenberg, and Silverman (18) used a semantic

differential to obtain viewer images of Nixon and Kennedy before, during, and after the 1960 debates. They found that as a consequence of the debates, Nixon and Kennedy's perceived image had moved farther away from the respondents' ideal image of a president. In effect, they contend that the debates helped neither of the candidates in regard to their image.

Kraus and Smith (11), in their investigation of Nixon's and Kennedy's images used a semantic differential developed by Smith specifically for use in speaking situations. They found, as might be expected, that Democrats and Republicans both held favorable opinions toward their respective candidates and held unfavorable opinions toward the opposite candidate. However, unlike Tannenbaum et al., they concluded that it was impossible to determine whether the candidates were helped or hindered by participating in the debates.

In an attempt to operationally define the dimensions of college students' verbal images of presidential candidates, Douglas (5) formed a new semantic differential which contained a collection of scales representing such dimensions as ethos, leadership, personality, person perception, inter-personal communication, and sensory.

While the creation and use of various measuring instruments in itself is not objectionable, failure to examine different candidates over time using the same instrument renders impossible fairly direct comparisons of the candidates developing political lives.

A major question can be raised concerning which definition of "image" the candidate and his staff should use to analyze the success or failure of political communications. If a candidate is relatively unknown, he and his staff will probably want to organize a specific kind of cognitive structure that reflects the qualities of the man they wish to present. An existing image structure may contain components not desired and which should be eliminated; conversely, the image may have several components but these may need some reorganization to present the most favorable picture of the candidate.

Equally important, the degree of "favorableness" must be assessed. Simply because a particular cognitive structure is generated there is no assurance that this structure will be placed at a point on some evaluative continuum that is advantageous to the candidate. Hence, it seems to us that two different kinds of "image" need to be examined to determine if the campaign communications are producing the desired results. Our purpose in this study was to isolate the different kinds of images and demonstrate how cognitive structure and evaluations are separable aspects of image analysis, demonstrate some effects of a single campaign communication, and suggest why it is important that more than mean profile scores be used in interpreting an image.

We will examine the "images" of Richard Nixon and George McGovern in 1972 and the "images" of Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972. In analyzing the 1972 data we will be concerned with the changes in candidate image resulting from viewing a half-hour televised biography of George McGovern presented in news format.

The analysis of the 1968-1972 data on Richard Nixon will examine changes over time. Intuitively, we would expect major changes in Nixon's image since 1968 when he was relatively unknown to our college student respondents. Nixon had not been a candidate since 1962 when he lost the California gubernatorial contest. In 1966 when Nixon did campaign on behalf of Republican candidates, he was not a candidate himself. Consequently, we surmised that the memories of Nixon as a presidential candidate in 1960 would be relatively unclear among college juniors in 1968.

A different situation existed in 1972. Nixon had been President of the United States for four years, and, by that time, had developed a clear image among college students. At the same time, George McGovern had been widely covered by the press, was presumably the favorite of the college student, and should have, we assumed, an equally stable image. Our basic questions revolved around the nature of the images of these two men and their similarities and differences.

Method

One hundred and six students in two communications courses at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale viewed the George McGovern biographical documentary carried on nationwide television. Immediately prior to viewing a video tape of the program, the respondents rated both George McGovern and Richard Nixon "as president" on a 28-item semantic differential (SD). Following viewing of the program the respondents re-rated both candidates and completed a short form asking for political preferences, perceived campaign issues, and demographic data.

The SD consisted of 28 pairs of bipolar adjectives drawn from those defining the dimensions of Safety, Qualification, and Dynamism reported by Lemert (12). The instrument was identical to the one used by Atwood et al. (1) and permits comparisons between the images of Richard Nixon obtained in 1968 and 1972 as well as comparisons between Nixon and George McGovern.

Data was analyzed in terms of: 1) the structure obtained by factor analysis of the 1968 and 1972 ratings for both the pre-test and post-test data, 2) the a priori dimensions of Safety, Qualification, and Dynamism, and 3) individual scales in terms of the 28 individual scales.

Data analysis was guided by the following hypotheses:

If Lemert's three dimensions are as highly generalized measures of image as his findings indicate then:

1) Dimensions derived from factor analysis of pre-test and post-test ratings of both Nixon and McGovern will be interpretable in terms of the dimensions of Safety, Qualification, and Dynamism although the adjective pairs in the derived dimensions may not be isomorphic with the a priori dimensions.

If the factors derived from the pre- and post-test ratings are found interpretable in terms of the Lemert dimensions then:

2) The factor structures for the two candidates will be essentially the same for the pre-test ratings.

3) There will be no substantial change in factor structure for either candidate from pre-test to post-test.

4) The factor structures for the two candidates will be essentially the same for the post-test ratings.

In terms of profiles:

5) Significant positive changes from pre-test to post-test will be found for McGovern on;

a) Overall SD profile, and

b) Each of the three a priori dimensions;

6) No significant changes will be found from pre-test to post-test for Nixon on;

a) Overall profile,

b) Any of the three a priori dimensions, and

c) Any individual adjective scale.

In comparing the 1968 and 1972 evaluations of Nixon we hypothesized:

7) The 1968 pre- and post-test factor structures will be interpretable in terms of the Lemert dimensions.

8) The factor structures for 1968 and 1972 will be essentially the same for:

a) Pre-test

b) Post-test

Although we are predicting significant differences in SD profiles, a priori dimensions, and individual scale ratings between pre-test and post-test ratings for McGovern (1972) and Nixon (1968 and 1972), we also expect the factor structures to be essentially the same in pre-test rating and to not change. While these may appear to be contradictory hypotheses, the predictions are quite independent.

The factor structures are based on the patterns of inter-scale correlations and have no necessary relationship to the absolute magnitude of the ratings on each bipolar pair of adjectives (8). Hence, the profiles could be at opposite extremes of the rating scale and yet exhibit identical structure. As long as the relative evaluations of individual scales within profiles for each candidate maintain their original relationships, the profiles themselves may slide up or down the score scale without altering the structure.

While factor analysis of correlation matrices eliminates knowledge of level and dispersion in the data and concerns itself only with pattern relationships, the tests of difference for profiles, dimensions, and individual scales are concerned with level and dispersion in the data sets. Thus, we are examining two different kinds of images for the candidates. Comparisons of candidate image on the profiles, dimensions, and individual scales from pre-test to post-test in 1968 and 1972 for each candidate and between candidates for the 1972 data were tested for dependent measures (6). The comparisons between 1968 and 1972 were for independent samples (6).

The factor analyses were principal factors solutions with rotation to varimax criteria. Squared multiple correlations were used as communality estimates, and the criterion for stopping factoring was a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0. The factor structures were compared for vector similarity according to procedures described by Harman (8). Where the coefficients

of congruence were 0.90 or greater, the factors were considered to be unchanged in the case of pre- to post-test comparisons for the two candidates or to be essentially the same factor where the comparisons were between the two candidates.

Results and Discussion

Pre-Test 1972

The factor analyses of the 1972 semantic differential pretest ratings of Nixon and McGovern each produced a three-factor solution that could be clearly interpreted in terms of Lemert's three dimensions of source credibility--Safety, Qualification, and Dynamism (12). Factor matching indicated that the structures for the two candidates were essentially the same for the three factors with coefficients of congruence of 0.92 (Safety), 0.91 (Dynamism), and 0.93 (Qualification). Hypothesis 2 is retained.

For McGovern, the Qualification dimension appeared first in the rotated matrix and accounted for the single largest proportion of variance initially extracted, 39.03 percent. The second factor, the Dynamism dimension, accounted for 8.35 percent, and the third factor, Safety, accounted for 4.68 percent of the total variance.

For Nixon the Safety dimension appeared first in the rotated matrix and accounted for 33.31 percent of the variance. The Dynamism dimension appeared second and accounted for 13.25 percent, and the Qualification dimension appeared third and accounted for 6.02 percent of the variance. Total variance

accounted for by the two solutions was 52.49 percent for McGovern and 52.58 percent for Nixon.

Although the factor structures were quite similar, the semantic differential profiles showed significant differences. The overall profile mean for McGovern was 5.13 compared with 4.41 for Nixon ($t=4.09$, $p < .01$; Table 1.) In terms of the a priori dimensions, the mean for McGovern on the Safety dimension, 5.15, was significantly greater than the mean for Nixon, 3.81 ($t=5.35$, $p < .01$), and the mean for McGovern on the Dynamism dimension, 5.05, was significantly greater than the mean for Nixon, 4.39, ($t=2.44$, $p < .05$). There was no significant difference between Nixon and McGovern on the pre-test Qualification dimension ($t=-.50$, $p < .05$). Sixteen of the 28 scales showed significant differences between the two candidates. Nine differences appeared among the 11 Safety scales, three among the eight Qualification, and four among the nine Dynamism scales (Figure 1). For all significant scale differences McGovern was rated more favorable than was Nixon except for the Qualification scales experienced-inexperienced and trained-untrained (Figure 1).

Post-Test 1972

Factor analyses of the 1972 post-test ratings of the two candidates isolated essentially the same factor structures as were found in the pre-test analyses. Hypotheses 1 and 3 may be retained. For McGovern the coefficients of congruence were 0.93 (Qualification), 0.94 (Dynamism), and 0.95 (Safety).

For Nixon the coefficients were 0.98 (Safety), 0.97 (Dynamism), and 0.96 (Qualification). Since all of these coefficients are above our a priori minimum of 0.90, Hypothesis 4 may be retained.

The Qualification dimension again appeared first in the rotated matrix for McGovern and accounted for 44.95 percent of the total variance in the initial extraction. The Dynamism dimension appeared second and accounted for 6.99 percent, and the Safety dimension appeared third and accounted for 4.52 percent of total variance.

For Nixon the Safety dimension again appeared first in the rotated matrix and accounted for 44.14 percent of the variance. Dynamism appeared second accounting for 11.86 percent, and Qualification appeared third and accounted for 5.82 percent of the total variance. Total variance accounted for by the three factors in the post-test analyses was 56.45 percent for McGovern and 61.81 percent for Nixon.

While the individual factors show high coefficients of congruence between the two candidates, the importance of the factors to the respondents appears to vary with the candidates. As noted above, the Qualification dimension accounted for the largest proportion of variance in the McGovern pre- and post-test analyses while Safety accounted for the smallest proportion. The reverse was the case for Nixon with the Safety dimension accounting for the largest proportion of variance and the Qualification dimension the smallest proportion.

Since the ratings were of the two candidates "as president" the data suggest different characteristics of the two candidates to be the primary bases for evaluation.

As was the case in the pre-test, the overall semantic differential profiles for the two candidates differed significantly. The profile mean for McGovern was 5.43 while the mean for Nixon was 4.45 ($t=6.90$, $p < .01$; Table 1). On the Safety dimension, the mean rating for McGovern, 5.45, was significantly higher than the mean for Nixon, 3.87 ($t=8.13$, $p < .01$). McGovern was also rated higher on the Dynamism dimension, 5.26, than was Nixon, 4.40 ($t=5.65$, $p < .01$). Again, there was no significant difference between the two candidates on the Qualification dimension as a whole ($t=1.96$; $.05 < p < .10$). Twenty-two of the 28 scales showed significant differences between the two candidates on the post-test ratings, an increase of six over the pre-test ratings (see Figures 1 and 2). The most important changes appeared in the Qualification dimension where Nixon's superior pre-test ratings on training and experience disappeared while McGovern's ratings on informed, expert, and qualified became significantly higher than Nixon's. These five changes are crucial in the comparisons of the different kinds of images, as we shall discuss below.

Overall, McGovern was rated significantly higher in the post-test, 5.43, than in the pre-test, 5.13 ($t=6.26$, $p < .01$; Table 1 and Figure 4). McGovern's post-test rating on the Safety dimension, 5.45, was significantly higher than the pre-

test rating, 5.15 ($t=3.91$, p .01), and the post-test Qualification dimension was also significantly higher, 5.57, than was the pre-test mean, 5.18 ($t=6.91$, $p < .01$). There was no significant difference between the post-test, 5.26, and the pre-test, 5.05, for the Dynamism dimension ($t=2.09$, $.05 < p < .10$). Hypothesis 5a is retained, but Hypothesis 5b must be rejected.

There were no significant differences between pre-test and post-test evaluations of Nixon on overall profile, on any of the three a priori dimensions, or on any individual scale, (Figure 3). Hypothesis 6 is retained.

Factor matching of the derived post-test factor structures for McGovern and Nixon indicated congruence on the Safety and Dynamism dimensions (coefficients of 0.92 and 0.94, respectively). However, as suggested by the shifts in the individual semantic differential scales reported above, the coefficient of congruence on the Qualification dimension for the two candidates dropped, in the post-test, to 0.86, below our a priori minimum value of 0.90 for factor similarity.

Two features of the scale score changes are important in terms of the lack of congruence on the Qualification dimension. One, Nixon was rated significantly higher than McGovern on training and experience in the pre-test while on the post-test there was no difference between the candidates on those scales. Second, on the three scales of informed, expert, and qualified, there was initially no difference between the two candidates, but in the post-test McGovern was rated significantly higher than Nixon.

The cancelling effect of these changes served to eliminate any overall significant difference appearing between the pre-test and post-test means on the a priori Qualification dimension, but the inter-scale correlations were changed sufficiently to lower the coefficient of congruence between Nixon's and McGovern's derived Qualification dimensions below our minimum level for factor similarity. Hence, some cognitive restructuring appears to have taken place without creating a significant difference in the point estimates of the respondents' mean ratings of the two candidates on the Qualification dimension. This is precisely the kind of communication effect we had in mind when we raised the question as to what definition of image should be analyzed by a candidate and his campaign organization.

Nixon 1968-1972

Factor analysis of the 1968 pre-test evaluations of Nixon isolated two factors accounting for 56.26 percent of the total variance. Factor 1 contained 18 of the 28 semantic differential scales nine of which were Safety scales. Four scales were Qualification and five were Dynamism scales. Factor 1 accounted for 45.96 percent of the variance. Factor 2 accounted for 10.31 percent of the variance and contained four Qualifications, four Dynamism and two Safety scales. While Factor 1 can be loosely interpreted as a Safety dimension, Factor 2 is not interpretable in terms of the original input dimensions. Hypothesis 8a must be rejected.

The post-test factor analysis isolated three factors accounting for 69.97 percent of the total variance. Factor 1 accounted for 51.14 percent of the variance and contained seven of the nine Safety scales from the pre-test Factor 1 and eight of the 11 Safety scales included in the instrument. Factor 2 accounted for 14.20 percent of total variance and contained four Qualification, four Dynamism and one Safety scale. Factor 3 accounted for 4.64 percent of total variance and contained three Dynamism, two Qualification, and two Safety scales. Again, Factor 1 may be interpreted as a Safety dimension, but neither Factor 2 nor Factor 3 can be interpreted in terms of the input dimensions. Hypothesis 8b must be rejected as well as Hypothesis 7.

In reference to the semantic differential profiles, a comparison of the pre-test profiles of Nixon showed 14 significant changes from 1968 to 1972, all toward the lower end of the scale (Figure 5). This was also true of the post-test comparisons where 11 significant changes were recorded (Figure 6). The majority of the changes, nine in both pre- and post-test, were within the Safety dimension.

The factor matching coefficients for the 1968 pre-test and post-test Factors 1 and 2 are 0.93 and 0.95, respectively. This indicates essentially the same factor structure for the two evaluations. However, Factor 3 in the post-test has a coefficient of congruence of 0.92 with Factor 1 in the pre-test. This suggests a lack of clarity in the respondents' perceptions of Nixon, and hence, in the structure. Examination of the post-test factor

matrix shows that six of the Factor 1 scales are factorially complex and have secondary loadings in excess of 0.4 on Factor 3, and three of the seven scales with their highest loading on Factor 3 are factorially complex with secondary loadings in excess of 0.4 on Factor 1.

As discussed earlier, we assumed that Nixon's perceived image in 1968 would be relatively weak among college students since, at that time, he had not been a candidate for six years. Consequently, the 1968 respondents' image of Nixon was probably ambiguous, and we should probably not expect to find the clearly delineated factors we obtained from the 1972 data.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Obviously, one cannot generalize specific outcomes from the behavior of 106 college students to all television viewers. Hence, to say that the nationwide audience of viewers of the McGovern political biography held either the specific profiles or the precise factor structures we found for the two candidates would be hazardous, at best. However, such a gross generalization was not the intent of our analysis. Rather, we have attempted to examine the relationships among different operationally defined "images" of the political candidate that are conceptualized by individuals who are receivers of a political communication. We must also remember that we have not exhausted all the possible definitions of "image."

Our concern was not with point estimates of "images" for projection to larger audiences but with the basic question of how television viewers engage in various kinds of "image" struc-

turing and restructuring. Thus, we make no pretense of being able to say what the nation as a whole, college students across the nation, or even on the SIU campus thought about the candidates. Since our subjects were overwhelmingly in favor of McGovern (66.7 percent), they obviously are not representative the nation's 18-24 year-old-voters who were split about 50-50 between Nixon and McGovern (19).

As we suggested earlier, a campaign communication strategy could be designed to change the cognitive structure of the voter's image of the candidate or simply shift the existing (and satisfactory) image structure along a favorable-unfavorable continuum,or both. We seriously doubt that one candidate's political programs can affect the audience image of the opposing candidate as suggested by Katz (20), among others.

Possibly the most important finding in our data is that viewing a program apparently can create a restructuring of image without showing a shift on the score scale as was the case with McGovern on the Qualification dimension relative to his relationship with Nixon's image. While the values for McGovern showed pre- post-test change on the mean score for the a priori dimension, it did not appear in the post-test comparisons of dimension means for Nixon and McGoverr and it was not sufficient to be detected in the pre- post-test factor matching for McGovern. However, it did become evident on the post-test factor matching for the two candidates as demonstrated by the coefficient of congruence which fell below our minimum criterion for factor similarity.

Additionally, the reorganization was in McGovern's image since there were no significant changes in any of the Qualification scales for Nixon from pre- to post-test. There were four significant changes in the Qualification scales for McGovern.

By interpreting just the differences on individual scales, overall profiles, or a priori dimensions, one could reasonably conclude that the program elicited changes in the subjects' perceived image of McGovern. On the other hand, the similarity of the factor structures from pre- to post-test for McGovern suggests that no such change took place. It is only when there are comparisons on the individual scales and the factor structures between the two candidates that the restructuring of McGovern's image becomes clear.

Overall, on the Safety and Dynamism dimensions we find rather simple effects of the program, in that the profile image of McGovern simply moved farther away from Nixon and became a more favorable evaluation on the score scale. However, in interpreting the Qualification dimension we find no readily apparent shifts for the profile but complex changes in that some significant differences between the two candidates disappeared while other scale differences became more pronounced. But, overall, on the Qualification dimension, no major differences appeared obvious to the profile analyst.

These findings suggest that in the long run the political communication analyst should seriously consider the analysis of more than one kind of possible change in candidate "image" if he

is to gain maximum information about the effectiveness of the messages presented through the public communication channels.

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TABLE 1

Mean Sematic Differential Ratings

Nixon-McGovern 1972 and Nixon 1968*

	McGovern		Nixon 1972		Nixon 1968	
SAFETY	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
Safe-Dangerous	4.54	5.10	3.70	3.77	5.23	5.00
Fair-Unfair	5.32	5.74	3.61	3 72	5.31	4.82
Gentle-Harsh	4.66	5.00	3.69	3.53	3.39	4.08
Unselfish-Selfish	5.12	5.36	3.12	3.51	4.02	4.20
Good-Bad	5.47	5.33	3.44	3.64	5.18	4.89
Reasonable-Unreasonable	5.26	5.54	3.76	3.59	4.93	4.85
Calm-Upset	4.88	5.12	4.51	4.50	4.61	4.38
Friendly-Unfriendly	5.95	6.01	4.23	4.27	5.25	5.25
Open Minded-Closed Minded	5.97	6.00	3.12	3.14	4.61	4.51
Stable-Unstable	4.61	5.28	4.53	4.64	5.18	4.80
Responsible-Irresponsible	4.88	5.51	4.23	4.35	5.56	5.23
Dimension Σ	56.66	59.99	41.94	42.66	53.27	52.01
Dimension $\bar{X}$	5.15	5.45	3.81	3.87	4.84	4.73
QUALIFICATION						
Experienced-Inexperienced	4.70	5.40	5.77	5.77	5.85	5.56
Intelligent-Unintelligent	5.44	5.82	5.21	5.51	5.69	5.72
Informed-Uninformed	5.26	5.77	5.27	5.15	5.72	5.59
Educated-Uneducated	5.85	6.04	5.70	5.77	6.10	5.92
Expert-Ignorant	4.88	5.24	4.65	4.83	5.15	5.00
Trained-Untrained	5.11	5.36	5.52	5.54	5.79	5.64
Skilled-Unskilled	5.10	5.42	5.13	5.15	5.64	5.31
Qualified-Unqualified	5.12	5.51	4.86	4.76	5.56	5.18
Dimension Σ	41.46	44.56	42.11	42.48	45.50	43.9
Dimension $\bar{X}$	5.18	5.57	5.26	5.31	5.69	5.49
DYNAMISM						
Bold-Timid	5.29	5.35	4.58	4.59	4.34	4.71
Agressive-Meek	5.27	5.35	4.84	4.87	5.07	4.95
Emphatic-Hesitant	4.53	4.94	4.12	4.13	3.80	4.18
Frank-Reserved	5.40	5.10	2.90	3.19	3.89	4.18
Active-Passive	5.92	6.00	5.04	4.91	5.62	5.53
Forceful-Forceless	4.92	5.17	4.69	4.63	4.85	5.02
Strong-Weak	4.83	5.41	4.60	4.47	4.93	4.77
Decisive-Indecisive	4.30	5.01	4.73	4.67	4.64	4.43
Fast-Slow	4.96	5.03	4.04	4.10	4.51	4.41
Dimension Σ	45.42	47.36	39.54	39.56	41.65	42.18
Dimension $\bar{X}$	5.05	5.26	4.39	4.40	4.63	4.69
Profile Σ	143.54	151.91	123.49	124.70	140.42	138.11
Profile $\bar{X}$	5.13	5.43	4.41	4.45	5.02	4.93

*For significant differences between candidates on adjective pairs see profiles, Figures 1 through 6.

Figure 1
Nixon-McGovern Pre-test Semantic Differential Profiles



Figure 2
Nixon-McGovern Post-test Semantic Differential Profiles



Figure 3

Nixon Pre-Post test Semantic Differential Profiles 1972



Figure 4
McGovern Pre-Post test Semantic Differential Profiles



Figure 5

Nixon Pre-Test Semantic Differential Profile 1968-1972



* p less than .05

Figure 6

Nixon Post-test Semantic Differential Profile 1968-1972